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THE RE-EMERGENCE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
AS A LIMIT ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER
UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Supreme Court has recently held that principles of intergovernmental
immunity, as reflected in the tenth amendment, prohibit Congress from exercising commerce power authority to extend federal minimum wage and maximum
hour laws to state employees. The author traces the relationshipof the doctrine
of intergovernmentalimmunity and the commerce power through four significant decisions: United States v. California, Maryland v. Wirtz, Fry v. United
States, and National League of Cities v. Usery. He concludes that the application of the immunity doctrineto the commerce power is reasonable,and perhaps
compelled by earlier interpretation, but criticizes the Court for its failure to
recognize the narrow limits placed on that doctrine by earliercase law.

I.

INTRODUCTION

TENSIONS ARISING out of the competition for power beTHE
tween the states and the federal government have many dimensions,
often grouped together under the rubric of federalism. In recent years
one of the recurrent problems of federalism has been defining the
limits of federal power where it operates directly on state-conducted
activities. 1 At one time courts espoused the doctrine that states should2
be treated no differently from private actors in the economic arena;
however, the Supreme Court has recently held otherwise. The existence of states as indestructible sovereign units now requires that they
have at least a limited immunity from federal economic regulation. 3
Historically, the tenth amendment has been the constitutional protector of state sovereignty interests.4 However, by framing arguments
in terms of this rather ambiguous amendment, judicial opinions have
sometimes obscured the underlying questions concerning the definition
of state sovereignty and how that sovereignty is protected under the
Constitution. While much judicial discussion has centered on attempts
to define and characterize the tenth amendment, the results have been
1. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). See also District of
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635
(1977); EPA v. Brown, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct.
1635 (1977).
2. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); United States v. California, 297 U.S.
175 (1936).
3. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The broad language of the amendment proclaims that:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
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have apparentfar from uniform, 5 and recent Supreme Court decisions
6
ly given the amendment yet another meaning.
It is the purpose of this Note to appraise the Court's rearticulation
of state sovereignty as a basis for immunity from congressional power
under the commerce clause.7 Accordingly, the analysis will begin with
United States v. California,' where this issue was initially considered.
Attention will then be directed to Maryland v. Wirtz,' Fry v. United
States, i0 and National League of Cities. v. Usery.II In order to fully
appreciate recent developments, however, two series of cases must be
reviewed. The first line of cases involves the regulation of private
activities pursuant to the commerce clause. The second line of cases
deals with the development of intergovernmental tax immunities. In
National League of Cities v. Usery, 12 these two lines converged. The
repercussions of this development may well be profound. While it is
too early to understand all of the effects of Usery, certain landmarks
have already appeared,' 3 and a preliminary appraisal is in order.
IX.

SOURCES OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Commerce Clause Cases

The first judicial statement on the scope of the commerce clause
was a broad one:
-We are now arrived at the inquiry-What is this power?
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by
which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others
vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution. . . . [T]he power
over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a
single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as arefound in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of
5. Compare, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) with Schecter

Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
6. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).

7. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
8. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
9. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
10. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
11. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
12. Id.

13. Consider in this regard the government's change of position which led to the
remand in EPA v. Brown, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977). See 42 Fed. Reg. 7957 (1977).
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Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence

which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in
many other instances, as that, for example, on declaring war,

the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them
from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people

must often rely solely, in all representative governments. 4
According to this interpretation, the Supreme Court would seem to
have abjured reading state sovereignty limitations into Congress' power over interstate commerce. This was not to be, however, for over the
years the commerce power has proven to be the most prolific source of
litigation of all federalism issues. For example, Congress' initial attempts at broad economic regulation of private activity were blocked
by state autonomy limits embodied in the tenth amendment, except
where the regulation was clearly aimed at the "intercourse and traffic"
of commerce. 15 This approach was followed in Schecter Poultry Corp.
v. United States,16 where the tenth amendment was held to be an
'explicit" limit on congressional power under the commerce clause. 17
In 1937, faced with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan, the Court abruptly changed course. 1 8 Without altogether
abandoning the interstate-local dichotomy, the Court, in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,19 embraced a practical approachlooking to the actual effects of the local activity on interstate commerce to determine the limits of congressional power. 20 As a result, the
force of state sovereignty arguments was greatly diminished:
14. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824) (emphasis added).
15. The Court struck down Congress' enactment of a federal child labor law under
the commerce clause because the production by children of goods for commerce was a
local activity, an activity whose regulation was considered to be reserved to the states
under the tenth amendment and beyond the "intercourse and traffic" which formed the
substance of the commerce power. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1917). See also
Delaware Lackawana & W. R.R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U.S. 439 (1915); United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). On the other hand, the Court had previously held
that activities relating to the transport and distribution of goods were clearly regulable.
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (transport of livestock to and from Chicago
Stockyards); Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
(Shreveport Rate Case) (intrastate rail transport in competition with an interstate network); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (transport of livestock to and
from stockyards).
16. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
17. Id. at 529.
18. See Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy 1933-46 (pts. I &
2), 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 883 (1946).
19. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
20. Id. at 41-42. The Court in Jones & Laughlin adopted the language of Justice
Cardozo's concurrence in Schecter and used this "effects" approach to harmonize the
two cases. Id. at 40-41.
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Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in
the light of our dual system of government and may not be
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our
complex society, would effectively obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government . . . .The question is necessarily one of degree. 2'
Four years after Jones v. Laughlin, the Court's perception of state
sovereignty barriers, based on the tenth amendment, had diminished to
the point that Justice Stone could state with apparent impunity that
"the tenth amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered.' '22 By 1946, the judicial conception of commerce had been sufficiently liberated from an earlier era's strict bifurcated approach to permit Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court in
North American Co. v. SEC,2 3 to state:
This broad commerce clause does not operate so as to
render the nation powerless to defend itself against economic
forces that Congress decrees inimical or destructive of the
national economy. Rather it is an affirmative power commensurate with the national needs. It is unrestricted by contrary
state laws or private contracts. And in using this great power,
Congress is not bound by technical legal conceptions. Commerce itself is an intensely practical matter. . . .To deal
with it effectively, Congress must be able to act in terms of
economic and financial realities. The commerce clause gives
it authority to so act. 24
The result of this more expansive doctrine was that the tenth
amendment and state sovereignty no longer played a role in the
definition of the subject matter of commerce. Indeed, the net effect of
this entire line of cases was that the court deferred to congressional
judgment concerning what is, or what affects, commerce. By permitting Congress to define commerce as a broad, national, economic
power, and by endorsing the technique of aggregating many small,
individually insignificant activities to find a substantial effect on commerce, 25 there was little basis upon which the Court could find an
improper regulation of private activity. So long as some national
21. Id. at 37.
22. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). See also Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
23. 327 U.S. 686 (1946).
24. Id. at 705 (citations omitted).
25. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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economic connective could be found, or arguably found, Congress
26
could regulate.
B.

IntergovernmentalImmunity Cases

While state sovereignty concerns all but disappeared in the area of
federal regulation of private activities under the commerce clause, they
remained alive where the federal government sought to act directly
upon state and local governments through taxation. Intergovernmental
immunity began, however, as a device to protect the federal government. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in McCulloch v.Maryland,27 declared that the states cannot exercise their taxing power
where to do so would create the potential to destroy the federal
instrumentality. 28 What troubled Justice Marshall most was the possibility that a state might harm the national government by taxing
federally-created institutions without federal interests being represented in the state legislature that imposed the tax. As he explained,
"[W]hen a state taxes the operations of the government of the United
States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents,
but by people over whom they claim no control." 2 9
The logical implication of this argument would seem to be that
reciprocal state immunity should not obtain, since states, through their
citizens' representatives, are represented in Congress and are not
politically vulnerable. 30 Nevertheless, such reciprocal immunities
were recognized in Collector v. Day,31 where the expressed rationale
was the need to protect the states' reserved powers under the tenth
amendment.3 2 Later cases expanded this doctrine to include derivative
26. This restriction may account for the Court's deference in cases such as Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), where a "rational basis" standard for review was
adopted. Id. at 303-04. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964). In Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), Justice Douglas' majority opinion
found a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce where the regulated activity "may"
affect interstate commerce, even when Congress has not expressly found such impact.
Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
27. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
28. Id. at431.
29. Id.at 435.

30. See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954).
31. 78 U.S. (1iWall.) 113 (1870), overruled inGraves v. New York exrel. O'Keefe,
306 U.S. 466 (1939).
32. Id. Day held that the salary of a state judge was immune from federal tax.
Instead of considering the question of political restraints, which had been important to
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immunities for private individuals transacting with the states 33 or the
federal government. 34 Derivative immunities were soon abandoned,
however, pursuant to judicial recognition of the "expanding needs of
state and nation," 35 and primary intergovernmental immunity was
correspondingly re-examined and narrowed. These developments parallelled the rise and decline of state sovereignty concerns under the
commerce clause.
In Helvering v. Gerhardt,36 employees of the Port of New York
Authority, a bi-state corporation, unsuccessfully challenged a federal
tax on their salaries. The Court recognized that intergovernmental
immunities originated as a device to protect the federal nature of the
Constitution, and used Justice Marshall's "part-acting-on-the-whole"
analysis to limit state immunities. 37 Without specifically examining the
basis for reciprocal state immunity from federal taxes, the Court
presented two guiding principles for state immunity. First, the activity
must be essential to the preservation of state governments, and second,
the benefit to the state, as in the case of a derivative immunity, must
the Court's analysis in McCulloch, the Day Court stated that federal immunity is based
on the need to protect federal sovereignty within its delegated powers. Id. at 124. The
tenth amendment attests to state sovereignty within the area of reserved powers: "[Tihe
States within the limits of their powers. . .[which are] 'reserved,' are as independent of
the general government as that government within its sphere is independent of the
States." Id. Viewing the maintenance of a state judiciary as "one of the sovereign
powers vested in the states by their constitutions, which remained unaltered and unimpaired .... " id. at 125, the Court held that the free exercise of sovereign powers
required reciprocal tax immunity. Id. at 127 (citing Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie
County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842) (holding a federal revenue officer immune from
state taxation)).
33. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932), overruled in Helvering
v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376,384 (1938); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United
States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931).
34. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928); Gillespie v. Oklahoma,
257 U.S. 501 (1922), overruled in Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376,
384 (1938).
35. Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 405 (1938), overruling Collector v.
Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871); Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S.
376, 384 (1938), overruling Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932) and
Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 157 U.S. 501 (1922); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S.
134 (1937) (limiting Panhandle Oil and Indian Motocycle to their facts and subjecting
persons contracting with the federal government to a state gross receipts tax).
36. 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
37. Id. at 416. The Court elaborated:
Once impaired by the recognition of a state immunity found to be excessive,
restoration of [the national taxing] power is not likely to be secured through the
action of state legislatures; for they are without the inducements to act which
have often persuaded Congress to waive immunities thought to be excessive.
Id. at 417.
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not be so speculative as to visit a burden on the federal government
38
disproportionate to the benefit enjoyed by the state.
Perhaps the leading case on state immunity is New York v. United
States ,3 in which New York State unsuccessfully claimed immunity
from federal taxes assessed against its mineral water bottling operation. No opinion garnered a majority of the Court, but Justices Frankfurter and Stone agreed (in separate opinions) that the principal reason
for intergovernmental immunity is to prevent the crippling obstruction
of one government by another4° or, as Justice Stone explained, "[to
prevent undue interference] with the. . . performance of its sovereign
functions of government. '"41 The Justices concurred that no clear
distinctions could be drawn between governmental and proprietary,4 2
or governmental and trading, 43 activities of a state. Thus, a majority of
the Court refused to concede that state immunity from federal taxes
44
exists in more than a limited area.
The net effect of cases such as New York v. United States and
Helvering v. Gerhardt in the tax immunity area, and of Jones &
Laughlin and its progeny in the commerce power area, was that state
sovereignty restrictions on congressional power to tax and to regulate
economic activities was minimal when the focus of congressional
action was private parties. This was true regardless of the effect of
such national policy decisions on the states. The result was apparently
the same when states engaged in economic activities in competition
with the private sector. 45 It was in this last area, however, that initial
38. Id. at 419-20.
39. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
40. Id. at 576, 589-90.
41. Id. at 587. The Justices disagreed, however, about the validity of a non-discriminatory tax applied to both states and private individuals. Id. at 588. The focus of the
Frankfurter-Stone debate in New York was on the extent of the tax immunity. Justice
Frankfurter argued that inquiring beyond whether the tax discriminates against the states
would raise a hornets' nest of fiscal and political factors unsuitable for judicial resolution. Id. at 581-82. Justice Stone and the dissenters, on the other hand, asserted
that the Court must go further and examine the peculiar effects of even a non-dis-

criminatory tax on a state's sovereign functions. Id. at 587, 591-92.
42. Id. at 586.
43. Id. at 580.
44. Justices Douglas and Black dissented. They asserted that any activity carried on
by a state that was legitimately within its police power was immune from federal taxes
under principles of federalism embodied in the tenth amendment. Id. at 594-95.
45. E.g., California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (subjecting the State of California
to the provisions of the National Railway Labor Act when operating a railroad); New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946). Cf. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184
(1964) (subjecting the state of Alabama to suit under the F.E.L.A. when operating a
railroad, despite its claim of sovereign immunity).

1977]

STATE SOVEREIGNTY

resolution of the conflict between state and federal power was found
inadequate, and further refinement was necessary.
II. DEATH AND REVIVAL: STATE SOVEREIGNTY
UNDER THE TENTH AMENDMENT

A.

Initial Resolution of State Immunities
Under the Commerce Clause

Ten years prior to New York v. United States,46 the Supreme Court
sought to explain the relationship between the commerce power and
intergovernmental immunities in United States v. California.'
California involved the application of the Federal Safety Appliance
Act, 48 to a state-owned railroad. California differed from other commerce clause cases in that the regulation fell upon a state rather than a
private party. Justice Stone, speaking for a unanimous Court, rejected
any application of principles drawn from intergovernmental tax immunity:
The analogy of the constitutional immunity of state instrumentalities from federal taxation. . . is not illuminating.
That immunity is implied from the nature of our federal
system and the relationship within it of state and national
governments, and is equally a restriction on taxation by either
of the instrumentalities of the other. Its nature requires that it
be so construed as to allow to each government reasonable
scope for its taxing power. . . which would be unduly curtailed if either by extending its activities could withdraw from
the taxing power of the other subjects of taxation traditionally
within it . . . .Hence we look to the activities in which the
states have traditionally engaged as marking the boundary of
the restriction upon the federal taxing power. But there is no
such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce.
The state can no more deny the power if its exercise
has been
49
authorized by Congress than can an individual.
Rather than examine closely why the "nature of our federal system"
required special limitations on the taxing power but not on the commerce power, 50 the California Court focused on the activity being
regulated and found that "California, by engaging in interstate commerce by rail, has subjected itself to the commerce power .... 9951
46. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
47. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
48. 45 U.S.C. §§ 2, 6 (1970).

49. 297 U.S. at 184-85 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 184.

51. Id. at 185.
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The Court expressly rejected any attempt to distinguish between
"sovereign" and "private" activities of a state, 52 and held simply that
whenever a state engages in an activity validly regulable under the
53
commerce power, it too will be subject to federal regulation.
This broad approach was followed as recently as 1968, in Maryland v. Wirtz, 4 Where the Court again considered the problem of
federal regulation of state activity, this time in the context of amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. 55 Two features of the amendments were especially significant. First, coverage was extended to all
employees of "an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. "56 Formerly the act had covered only
"employees engaged in commerce or the production of goods for
commerce." 57 The change to an enterprise concept expanded the class
of covered employees, but not the class of covered employers, and the
Wirtz Court had little difficulty finding the extension valid under the
commerce clause.58 The second, and doctrinally more difficult aspect
of the amendments, was the extension of coverage to hourly employees working for state schools and hospitals. In approving that extension of the Act, the majority held that "[ijf a State is engaging in
economic activities that are validly regulated by the federal government when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced
59
to conform its activities to federal regulation."
From the point of view of the majority, the amendments did not
"tell the States how to perform medical and educational functions
...
. Congress has 'interfered with' these State functions only to the
extent of providing that when a State employs people in performing
such functions it is subject to the same restrictions as a wide range of
other employers whose activities affect commerce. . ... 60 Because
the majority interpreted the amendments as having only a minimal
52. Id. at 183.

53. Id. at 183-84. With hindsight it is apparent that the California Court need not
have stated its holding so broadly. Subsequent interpretation has made it clear that the
operation of a railroad is not subject to protection even if intergovernmental immunity
principles are applied. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 854-55.
54. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
55. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1970).
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
57. Pub. L. No. 718, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062, 1063 (emphasis added).

58. The Court found this result consistent with both United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941), and NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 392 U.S.
at 190-92.
59. 392 U.S. at 197.
60. Id. at 193-94.
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effect on the states, the Court could have avoided the issue of whether
there are any limits on the commerce power, and still have reached the
same result, by holding that such intrusions do not materially impair
state sovereignty. Instead, the Wirtz majority followed the lead of the
California Court by denying the existence of any special state
sovereignty limits on the commerce power. The majority reasoned that
whenever Congress acts within the scope of a delegated power, it may
"override countervailing state interests." 61 The Court described as
"simply not tenable" the argument that because of state sovereignty
the Act could not be constitutionally applied to state-operated schools
and hospitals. 62 So long as there is a rational basis upon which
Congress can find that a given economic activity affects commerce,
the Court held that Congress has the power to regulate anyone, includ63
ing a state, who engages in that activity.
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. Although the
dissenters acknowledged the validity of the enterprise concept, 64 they
balked at applying the amendments to states, arguing that principles of
intergovernmental immunity should apply to protect "that sovereignty
. . .attested [to] by the Tenth Amendment." 65 Relying upon Justice
Marshall's assertion in McCulloch v. Maryland that the power to tax is
the power to destroy, 66 Justice Douglas asserted that restraints based
upon state sovereignty should apply to both the taxing" power and the
commerce power, 67 since the exercise of the latter may also prove
destructive to the states. 6 8 The crux of the problem for Justice Douglas
was the broad scope of the "interstate commerce" concept. He felt
that unchecked congressional exercise of the commerce power might
"snuff out state sovereignty.'"69 Claiming that the use of the enterprise
approach, although valid as applied to private employers, would
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the state itself was such an
"enterprise," Justice Douglas envisioned pervasive federal regulation
of state policy choices resulting from the regulation of the economic
70
activities which manifest those choices.
61. Id. at 195.
62. Id.

63. Id.at 194-97.
64. Id.at 197.
65. Id.at 205.
66. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1824).

67. 392 U.S. at 205.
68. Id.at 204.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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The majority's response to this argument was not compelling. As
stated above, the activity was found to be regulable under the commerce clause because the majority focused on the economic activity
involved, rather than the nature of the actor. But the majority failed to
address the real thrust of Justice Douglas' argument that since a state
was the actor the tenth amendment required a different result. The
majority's answer was a finding that there was only a limited intrusion 71 upon the states which could not cause the result Justice Douglas
predicted, and a remark in a footnote that if such a problem actually
arose, notions of "what is commerce" would eliminate the problem.7 2
Although no such definitional lines were actually drawn, the majority
was apparently willing to define "economic activities" so as to leave
to the states choices about the character of services to be provided. It is
unclear how this could be accomplished, however, without either
adopting the position of the dissent or narrowing the definition of
"interstate commerce." 73 If the majority were to treat states differently than other actors under the commerce clause, this would amount
to adopting the position of the dissent. If instead, certain types of
activities were deemed not to affect interstate commerce, regardless of
their actual economic effects, this would be a retreat from the "practical effects" approach endorsed in Jones v. Laughlin.
Any doubts about the majority's view of the relationship of the
commerce power and state sovereignty were resolved, however, when
the Wirtz majority expressly approved the statement in California that
principles of intergovernmental immunity are irrelevant to commerce
power regulation of state activities.7 4 They concluded that
[the] Court . . .will continue to examine federal statutes to
determine whether there is a rational basis for regarding them
as regulations of commerce among the States. But it will not
carve up the commerce power to protect enterprises indistinguishable in their effect on commerce from private business,
simply because those enterprises happen to be run by the
States for the benefit of their citizens.7"
Even though the majority focused on the enterprise involved rather
than its component parts, it is important to recognize that the amend71. See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
72. 392 U.S. at 196-97 n.27.
73. Id. For a circuit court opinion attempting to apply this "economic activity" test,
see Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 838-39 (1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635
(1977). The problem of applying this test has been rendered moot, however, by subsequent case law. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See also
part IV-C infra.

74. 392 U.S. at 198-99. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
75. 392 U.S. at 198-99.
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ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act considered in Wirtz involved
the state in its capacity as an employer, not simply as an operator of
hospitals and schools. The Court reasoned that once an economic
activity is found to be within the commerce power, all aspects of that
activity are regulable to the same extent they would be if undertaken in
the private sector. Thus, under Wirtz, the only issue is whether a
course of conduct amounts to an economic activity which affects
commerce. Given the expansive approach to that question adopted in
Jones & Laughlin and its progeny, 76 it would seem to be a short,
logical step from regulating the state as an employer when operating a
hospital or a school to regulating all the employment activities of the
states.
The Revival of State Sovereignty: Fry v. United States
When the Court was next faced with interpreting a potentially far
reaching federal regulatory statute in Fry v. United States, it was not
prepared to go as far as the Wirtz majority in rejecting federalism as a
constraint on power. The Court was able to avoid a direct confrontation with Wirtz, however, by distinguishing the two cases on their
facts. 78 In Fry, the Court had to decide whether the Economic Stabilization Act,79 which authorized the President to issue wage and price
restraints, was intended to reach states and their employees. If so, the
issue became whether Congress had the power under the commerce
80
clause to authorize such restraints.
B.

The Court had little trouble finding a congressional intent to cover
state employees. The legislative history showed that Congress had
specifically rejected an amendment exempting such employees.8 1 Accordingly, the Court directed most of its attention to the issue of
76. See notes 18-26 supra and accompanying text.
77. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
78. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
79. Pub. L. No. 91-382, 84 Stat. 799, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 744, Pub. L. No.

93-27, 87 Stat. 27.
80. As the Court indicated, this issue was not raised below nor in petitioner's brief.
Only in the briefs amici curiae was an issue of statutory interpretation raised. 421 U.S. at

545 n.5.
81. 117 CONG. REC. 43673-77 (1971). In addition the Court cited several earlier cases
for support. 421 U.S. at 546. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), cited by the Court,
involved the application of the World War IIEmergency Price Control Act to timber'sold

by the state of Washington. In contrast to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, the
Statute at issue in Case expressly included the United States "or any other government,
or any of its political subdivisions .... " 327 U.S. at 99. The 1970 statute was not as
clear. 421 U.S. at 546. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 186 (1936), also cited by
the Court, more closely resembles Fry with respect to the statutory interpretation issue.
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congressional power under the commerce clause. The majority held
that a short-term wage freeze directed at state employees as well as
those in the private sector was permissible under the Constitution
despite the potential for displacing state policy choices. The Court
found that this regulation was a lesser intrusion upon the sovereign
status of the states than the amendments to the FLSA upheld in
Wirtz,82 and noted that "the effectiveness of federal action would have
been drastically impaired if wage increases to [state] employees were
83
left outside the reach of these emergency federal wage controls."
The effect on commerce of wages paid to state employees was not
disputed. 84 Instead, it was argued that a limitation on the commerce
clause arises when the actors are the states: "[Petitioners] contend that
applying the Economic Stabilization Act to state employees interferes
with sovereign state functions . ... 85 The Court did not reject the
argument; in a footnote, the majority appeared to endorse this approach of defining the limits of the commerce power in terms of state
sovereignty limitations.8 6 In addition although the focus in Wirtz was
on the economic activities involved,87 and not on the actor, 88 the Fry
Court cited Wirtz for a somewhat different proposition: "Wirtz
reiterated the principle that States are not immune from all federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause merely because of their
sovereign status. "89 The Fry Court thus implied that States may be
immune from some federal regulation precisely because of their
sovereign status. That conclusion is reinforced when the above quoted
passage is taken together with the express rejection of the "tenth
amendment as a truism" language 90 contained in United States v.
Darby.91 In recognizing that there may be restaints of this type, the
Fry Court differed markedly with Wirtz, where such arguments were
considered "simply . . . not tenable.' '92 In Wirtz, "the Court put to
rest the contention that state concerns might constitutionally 'out82. 421 U.S. at 548.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 547. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
255 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11.1, 127-28 (1942).
85. 421 U.S. at 547.
86. Id. at 547-48 n.7.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

392 U.S. at 197.
Id. at 197-98 (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 183-85).
421 U.S. at 548 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 347-48 n.8.
312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
392 U.S. at 195.
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of an otherwise valid federal statute regulating
weigh' the importance
93
commerce."
In light of how the analysis in Fry differed from that in Wirtz on
whether challenges to commerce power enactments may be presented
on the basis of state sovereignty limitations, it was somewhat disingenuous for the Fry Court to find Wirtz conclusive in resolving
whether a wage freeze runs afoul of such a limitation. 94 Despite the
marked change in the Court's analysis, however, it avoided a direct
confrontation with the holding in Wirtz by finding the Economic
Stabilization Act "less intrusive" than the extension of the FLSA to
certain employees in state-operated schools and hospitals, which was
at issue in Wirtz. 95 The limited duration and emergency character of
the Economic Stabilization Act made it less intrusive. Yet the Court
distinguished the legislation at issue in Wirtz without reference to the
fact that the FLSA amendments were far more narrow in scope than the
Economic Stabilization Act which covered all state employees, not just
those in a given economic activity. 96 Seizing on the emergency and
short-term character of the Act, the Court found a compelling national
need, and balanced it against a minimal intrusion on state interests. As
a result, the Court approved the use of power in a national economic
emergency, without sanctioning the total federal regulation of the
states forecast by Douglas in Wirtz. 97 At the same time, the Court was
able to dispose of the constitutional power question on a broad basis
because it was not forced to decide which state employees may permissibly be covered by the Act and which may not.
Unlike the majority, the dissent in Fry directly attacked the reasoning and the holding of Wirtz. In a carefully articulated opinion,
Justice Rehnquist explicated principles later adopted by a majority of
the Court in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery.98 His basic contention
was in accord with the dissent in Wirtz :99 when the federal government
seeks to regulate state-conducted activity, principles governing federal
regulation of private activity ought not necessarily be controlling.
Rather, principles and limits drawn from intergovernmental immunities should direct the Court because they represent a means to
resolve the tension that results when one sovereign acts upon
93. Id. at 195-96.
94. 421 U.S. at 548.
95. Id.
96. Id. In contrast, the unlimited scope of the Act was of critical importance to the
dissent. Id.at 558.
97. 392 U.S. at 204-05 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
98. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
99. 392 U.S. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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another.' 00 Justice Rehnquist further contended that a non-discriminatory regulation may be more burdensome to a state than a nondiscriminatory tax because the former disrupts state policy choices to a
seek only money, regulafar greater extent than the latter. While10 taxes
1
tions may directly affect much more.
Justice Rehnquist recognized United States v. California,102 which
had expressly rejected any application of intergovernmental immunity
principles to commerce power cases, as the major obstacle to his
analysis. 10 3 He asserted that the treatment of intergovernmental immunities in California was wrong, 10 4 that governmental immunity is
an affirmative right of the states not unlike the first or fifth amendment
rights of individuals, except that it has no explicit constitutional source
beyond the concept of federalism.10 5 He argued that the immunity
should apply equally to regulations as well as taxes.I16 Justice Rehnquist's view of the role of state sovereignty restraints was perhaps best
100. 421 U.S. at 552-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101. Where the Federal Government seeks only revenue from the State, the
State may provide the revenue and make up the difference where it
chooses . . . .But where the Federal Government seeks not merely to collect
revenue as such, but to require the State to pay out its moneys to individuals at
particular rates, not merely state revenue, but also state policy choices suffer.
Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
103. Justice Rehnquist's suppositions about the Court's motivation in California
appear questionable. He suggested that the Court might not have been sensitive to claims
of states' rights brought by the states themselves since California was decided at a time
when the Court had begun to discard federalism limitations, and when limits were
typically urged by private parties seeking to avoid federal regulation. 421 U.S. at 551.
This premise is not totally accurate. California was decided after Schecter Poultry, but
before Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the latter being one of the most
"'anachronistic and doctrinally unsound" cases ever decided. 421 U.S. at 551 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also 426 U.S. at 867-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting). California
antedated the inception of the commerce clause revolution. More importantly, state
sovereignty interests, as embodied in intergovernmental immunities, still represented a
formidable barrier to congressional exercise of the taxing power. Cases such as Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), Graves v. New York exrel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466
(1939), and New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), had yet to limit and
reformulate the doctrine. See notes 27-44 supra and accompanying text. Even if it had
recognized the "different tenor" of a claim of state sovereignty raised by the state, the
California court was faced with an attempt to regulate a railroad, the quintessential
example of interstate commerce. Had the Court borrowed from intergovernmental
immunity doctrine, the affirmative limitation on the commerce power thus created would
have been far-reaching. This is because the scope of intergovernmental immunities in
1936 included derivative immunities for individuals. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text. Such a ruling could have led to a major reduction in federal power over
railroads, an area previously considered basic to federal control over interstate commerce. See notes 46-53 supra and accompanying text.
104. 421 U.S. at 552 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also noted that the
Fry majority questioned the reasoning of California. Id.
105. Id. at 553-54.
106. Id.
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illustrated when he compared his analysis in Fry to Hans v. Louisiana ,107 a case extending state immunity from suit in federal court to
claims brought by its own citizens:
As it was not the Eleventh Amendment by its terms which
justified the result in Hans, it is not the Tenth Amendment by
its terms that prohibits congressional action which sets a
mandatory ceiling on the wages of all state employees. Both
Amendments are simply examples of the understanding of
those who drafted and ratified the Constitution that the States
were sovereign in many respects, and that although their
legislative authority could be superseded by Congress in
many areas where Congress was competent to act, Congress
was nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it were just
another
individual or business enterprise subject to regula108
tion.
Simply stated, Justice Rehnquist was concerned with what he perceived as the majority's failure to properly acknowledge the structural
limitations on the exercise of power under a federal system.
Notwithstanding the careful analysis of the relationship of the
commerce clause to federalism restraints manifested in intergovernmental immunities, Justice Rehnquist's opinion contains three significant flaws. First, it failed to identify or to balance the competing
interests implicated when a claim is made under this "affirmative
constitutional defense."1 0 9 Instead, Justice Rehnquist offered only his
conclusions.11 0 It is necessary to know why state-operated railroads are
not "traditional," while "the operation of schools, hospitals and like
facilities . . . is an activity sufficiently closely allied with traditional
state functions that the wages paid by the State. . .should be beyond
Congress' commerce authority.""' What is needed is an operational
definition of a traditional state function. None is offered. Equally
important is the fact that Justice Rehnquist failed to explain why the
balance struck by the majority between national needs and state interests was improper.
107. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
108. 421 U.S. at 557 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is regrettable that the majority
opinion in Usery did not make this point clear.
109. Id. at 553.
110. [T]he activity of the State of California in operating a railroad was so unlike
the traditional governmental activities of a State that Congress could subject it
to the Federal Safety Appliance Act. But the operation of schools, hospitals,
and like facilities involved in Maryland v. Wirtz is an activity sufficiently
closely allied with traditional state functions that the wages paid by the State to
employees of such facilities should be beyond Congress' commerce authority.
Such a distinction would undoubtedly present gray areas . . . . But today's
case, in which across-the-board wage. . . ceilings are sustained with respect to
virtually all state employees, is clearly on the forbidden side of that line.
Id. at 557-58 (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at 558.
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The second major flaw in Justice Rehnquist's analysis is his failure
to address the fundamental separation of powers issue which pervades
the judicial resolution of federalism disputes. That issue was the focus
of the Frankfurter-Stone debate in New York v. United States, 112 and it
is the basis of Justice Brennan's dissent in NationalLeague of Cities
v. Usery. 113 Even if it is proper to recognize restraints on the commerce
power which arise out of the need to protect state sovereignty, it does
not necessarily follow that the Court, rather than Congress, is best
equipped to resolve them. Fry may show that Justice Frankfurter was
substantially correct when, in the context of tax immunities, he asserted that judicial decisions regarding the limits of power based solely on
sovereignty principles bring difficult fiscal and political factors into
play. He claimed that those factors may not be appropriate for judicial
resolution because, "the problem cannot escape issues that do not lend
themselves to judgment by criteria and methods of reasoning that are
within the professional training and special competence of judges." 114
In Fry, a majority of the Court found itself unable to choose among the
various fiscal and political interests and deferred to Congressional
5
judgment.' 1
The third flaw is Justice Rehnquist's failure to adequately consider
the implications of his analysis for other congressional powers. The
opinion made passing reference to the comparative reach of congressional authority under the war power and under the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments. 116 While the nature and limits of congressional
power under the Civil War amendments may involve somewhat separate issues,' an analysis of the limits on the war power is relevant to
the problem faced by this Court. If, as Justice Rehnquist suggests, the
taxing power and the commerce power should both be subject to
federalism restraints because each may be used to destroy the states,118
should all article I powers, including the war power, be so limited
because each may be used to impair state sovereignty? If logic compels
an affirmative answer, then the differing results which Justice Rehnquist would urge with regard to wage and price restraints under the war
and commerce powers respectively, 119 can only be achieved by recog112. 326 U.S. 572 (1946). See note 41 supra.
113. 421 U.S. at 559.
114. 326 U.S. at 581 See note 41 supra. After Usery it is apparent that the present
Court has concluded otherwise.
115. 421 U.S. at 548.
116. Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
118. 421 U.S. at 553-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
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nizing the different balance struck when the various interests-federal
and state-are measured against one another, and not because the war
power is inherently different.120 This third flaw, not critically evident
in the Fry dissent, becomes apparent when one examines the Court's
attempt to draw workable distinctions arising out of the affirmative
federalism limits recognized in Usery.
Re-examination of State Sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment:
National League of Cities v. Usery
National League of Cities v. Usery121 involved the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, extending coverage of the Act's
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to virtually all state
employees falling within the general statutory guidelines, 122 regardless
of the economic activity involved. The argument posed by appellants
and adopted by the Court was essentially that articulated in the Fry
dissent. 2 3 The Court acknowledged that the employment activities of a
state fall within the broad definition of commerce,' 24 but determined
that state sovereignty constraints were viewed to be "an affirmative
limitation on the exercise of its power . . "125 Usery posited that
the important inquiry is whether a given set of state determinations
"are 'functions essential to separate and independent existence'...
so that Congress may not abrogate the States' otherwise plenary
authority to make them."' 26 The Court in Usery found that the amendments in question -would
significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure
employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks
and recreation. These activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments . . . .Indeed, it is
functions such as these which governments are created to
provide, services such as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens. 27
C.

120. Id. at 558.
121. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
122. Id. at 838-39. The general statutory exception exempted executive, administra-

tive, professional, and elected officials regardless of economic activity. 29 U.S.C. § 213
(a)(1) (1970), 29 U.S.C. § 203e2(c) (Supp. V 1975) (declared unconstitutional in part in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
123. See notes 98-120 supra and accompanying text.
124. 426 U.S. at 840-41.
125. Id. at 841.
126. Id. at 845-46 (citations omitted) (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).
127. 426 U.S. at 851 (footnote omitted).
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As a result, the 1974 amendments were held to be outside the scope of
congressional power. To the extent that Maryland v. Wirtz 2 ' had
relied on the language in United States v. California,129rejecting the
application of tax immunity principles to the commerce power, it was
overruled. 130 California was accordingly modified but held to be
distinguishable on its facts. 131 Fry v. United States 132 was distin33
guished, largely on the basis of its emergency, short-term character. 1
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and White, dissented,
arguing that there is no role for the judiciary in the accommodation of
state sovereignty interests under the commerce clause. 134 Such functions were seen as exclusively reserved to the political process. 135 Tax
immunity cases were inapposite because the power to tax and the
power to regulate commerce are delegated separately under article I,
36
section 8 of the Constitution.'
Justice Stevens, dissenting separately, refused to embrace Justice
Brennan's extreme position with regard to the judicial role in commerce power issues. Instead, he saw the problem as one of linedrawing, and could not see why the line should be drawn where the
majority placed it. 137 He recognized that the judiciary has no power to
resolve certain questions of policy, something he considered the ma38
jority to have done. 1
Justice Blackmun joined in the majority opinion, but wrote a brief,
yet significant concurrence as well. He stated that the only acceptable
way for the Court to manage a state sovereignty limitation on the
commerce power was to adopt a balancing approach. Reading the
139
majority as following that approach, he joined it.
128. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
129. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
130. 426 U.S. at 853-54.
131. Id. at 854-55.
132. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
133. 426 U.S. at 852-53. The Usery majority also found that the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 was constitutionally more acceptable than the 1974 amendments to the

FLSA because "[the] Act operates to reduce the pressures on state budgets rather than
increase them." Id. But, state policy choices suffer under both statutes. As Justice
Brennan pointed out, "it is absurd to suggest that there is a constitutionally significant
distinction between curbs against increasing wages and curbs against paying wages lower
than the federal minimum." Id. at 872.
134. 426 U.S. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 863-64.
137. Id. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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The majority in Usery, in pursuit of an affirmative restraint on the
commerce power, found primary support in the intergovernmental tax
immunity cases. 14 ' Additional support was also sought from other
sources. First the Court looked to the statement in Fry that the tenth
amendment was "not without significance.' 141 Fry, however, affirmed the use of the commerce power, and was not direct support.
The second source was the language in Wirtz that "[t]he Court has
'the utter destruction of the State as a
ample power to prevent .
sovereign political entity.' "142 But, as the Usery dissent noted, Wirtz
was a pure power case-one in which the only relevant question was
whether the economic activities affected commerce. 143 Finally, the
majority pointed to a series of nineteenth century cases. Only in one of
the three cases, Coyle v. Smith,'" was the scope of congressional
power at issue. 145 The Coyle Court held that the power to admit states
was only the power to admit equal states, but did not find that state
sovereignty stood as an affirmative limitation, or in any way affected
46
that congressional power. 1
Thus, notwithstanding the Court's reliance on other sources, the
key to the majority's analysis in Usery remains the intergovernmental
tax immunity cases. They represent the Court's only articulation of
state sovereignty as a limitation upon an otherwise plenary congressional power. 47 For the majority, it was enough to recognize that both
the taxing power and the commerce power "find their genesis in Art.
I, § 8" 148 and therefore149to conclude that similar state sovereignty limits
should attach to both.
140. Id. at 843-44 (citing New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946)); Metcalf &
Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926)).

141. 426 U.S. at 842-43. Reliance on Fry is understandable, given the rejection of the
"tenth amendment as a truism" language contained therein. See section III-B supra.

142. 392 U.S. at 196 (footnote omitted).
143. Justice Brennan pointed out that the" 'ample power'

..

was not found.

. .

to

result from some affirmative limit on the exercise of the commerce power but rather in
the Court's function of limiting the congressional exercise of its power to regulation of

'commerce.'" 426 U.S. at 860 n.3. See section Ill-B supra.

144. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
145. The other two cases were Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), involving

the effect of Texas' secession on several United States bonds it held, and Lane County
v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869), considering the ability of the states to prescribe

the mode of payment for taxes state citizens owed their state.
146. 221 U.S. at 567, 580. The Usery dissent further distinguished these cases. 426

U.S. at 867-68 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
148. 426 U.S. at 843-44 n.14.
149. The majority summarily rejected the argument, raised by Justice Brennan's
dissent, that the sole federalism restraints on congressional exercise of the commerce
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The first of four significant problems with the majority's approach
in National League of Cities v. Usery is the Court's failure to furnish
an adequate, constitutionally significant reason for applying tax immunity principles to the commerce power. As noted above, the only
reason offered by the majority is that both the tax and the commerce
power are found in article I, section 8;150 no analysis was offered to
explain why textual position alone mandated equal treatment. Justice
power are political. Id. at 841-42 n.12. (Justice Brennan's argument found support in
Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 197 (1824).) The
majority explained that, even where the party whose constitutional power is impaired
participates in the legislative process (i.e. the states through their representatives), such
participation does not validate the legislative act. 426 U.S. at 841-42 n. 12. The majority
supported this proposition with cases in which congressional enactments were held
unconstitutional because they usurped the presidential power over appointments. Id.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
The two crucial differences between the separation of powers problem in Buckley
and the federalism dispute in Usery are, first, that in Buckley the Court is acting to
protect an express constitutional power, the power of appointments under article II, § 2,
clause 2, whereas in Usery there is no express constitutional protection for state control
over its employment relationships. Rather, there is only the ambiguous notion of reserved power under the tenth amendment. Second, and perhaps more important, the
majority was either unwilling or unable to recognize the distinction between "vertical"
constitutional disputes (conflicts between the states and the federal government) and
"horizontal" disputes (conflicts between the three branches of the federal government).
The Constitution is fundamentally the enumeration of federal powers. Commentators
largely agree that the role of judicial review in vertical disputes is primarily to protect the
federal powers from encroachment by the states. Freund, Umpiring the FederalSystem,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 567 (1954); Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 543, 546-52 (1954). The Court is on "weaker ground," as described by
Professor Wechsler and by Justice Brennan, when it decides a vertical dispute against
the exercise of federal power and in favor of the states which participated in the federal
action through representation in Congress. Wechsler, supra at 559; 426 U.S. at 857-59
(Brennan, J., dissenting). In a horizontal dispute, on the other hand, the Court's role in
resolving conflicts between the executive and the legislature is not protector of one party
against the encroachments of the other; rather the Court's role in a balance of powers
dispute is to protect the tripartite structure of the federal government as provided in the
Constitution-even in the face of voluntary relinquishments of that power. Chief Justice
Taft observed that: "it is a breach of National fundamental law if Congress gives up its
legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it
attempts to invest itself or its members with either executive power or judicial power."
Hampton & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). Therefore, the Court is properly
zealous when it halts the attempts of the other two branches to alter the constitutional
structure; but in federalism disputes, its proper role is more limited.
150. Perhaps significant to the outcome of the case, as the majority noted, is the fact
that the appellee (the government) acknowledged the existence of judicially cognizable
state sovereignty limits. 426 at 842. In effect, the government abandoned the basic
separation of powers argument offered by the dissent, and argued that the state
sovereignty tensions were of sufficient magnitude in Usery to require the use of a
balancing of interests approach to resolve the issue. Brief for Appellee at 36-41, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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Brennan's dissent was of no assistance in this regard. He was content
to maintain that commerce was not tax and to inquire no further. 15' The
result was that both the majority and the dissent could each parade a
number of taxing,1 52 commerce, 153 and war 54 power cases for each
opposing position.
The debate would have been more edifying had the majority
referred to the dissent in Fry. There, Justice Rehnquist did address this
issue, noting that tax immunities were based on the proposition that the
power to tax is the power to destroy. He reasoned further that the
power to regulate could be equally destructive and should therefore be
subject to the same restraint. 55 Perhaps the majority was trying to
make this same point when, after a lengthy discussion of the asserted
fiscal effects of the amendments and how they might alter state policy
choices,' 56 it spoke of "displac[ing] the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions
. . "I57 Unfortunately, by phrasing the issue in terms of "whether
these determinations [wages and hours of state employees] are 'functions essential to separate and independent existence' ",'1 the Court
151. 426 U.S. at 863-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell,
269 U.S. 514 (1926).
153. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968); North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); Santa Cruz Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453 (1938); United States v.
California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819).
154. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
155. 421 U.S. at 554 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
156. 426 U.S. at 846-52. The majority failed to consider a leading tax immunity case
which dealt with the contention that it is an essential state function to pay substandard
wages. In Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), the Court observed that:
even though, to some unascertainable extent, the tax deprives the states of the
advantage of paying less than the standard rate for the services for which they
engage, it does not curtail any of those functions which have been thought
hitherto to be essential to their continued existence as states. At most it may be
said to increase somewhat the cost of state governments . ...
Id. at 420. If principles of tax immunity are relevant to commerce power enactments, it
is difficult to see why a tax that hinders the payment of substandard wages is constitutionally less intrusive of state sovereignty (measured by its "essential functions") than a
regulation which has the same effect. This is particularly the case where, as the Usery
majority notes, the factual issues relating to the exact degree of intrusion are not
resolved. 426 U.S. at 846. Perhaps the regulations at issue pose a threat sufficiently
different in kind from those in Helvering v. Gerhardt that "resolution of the factual
issues as to the effect of the amendments is not critical to our disposition of the case."
Id. Such a difference is not apparent.
157. 426 U.S. at 852.
158. Id. at 845 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).
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did not address the underlying policy question of whether the effects of
burdensome regulation are similar to burdensome taxes. Instead, the
inquiry was limited to whether these choices are important to the state.
This weakness in the majority's analysis of the relationship of
intergovernmental immunity principles to the commerce clause is
further evidenced by the Court's handling of Case v. Bowles.159
Reiterating that "the Tenth Amendment 'does not operate as a limitation upon the powers, express or implied, delegated to the national
government,' "160 the Case Court upheld the validity of certain price
restraints as applied to timber sold by the state of Washington. The
statute at issue in Case 161 was not unlike the price component of the
Act considered in Fry, 6 2 save that it was enacted under the congressional war power, rather than the commerce power. If one were to
follow the Usery Court's logic, the war power, like the commerce and
taxing powers, "finds its genesis in Art. I, § 8" 163 of the Constitution
and thus should be subject to similar affirmative limitations. At this
point, noting the similarity between Fry and Case, the majority in
Usery could have distinguished the war power price controls on the
same basis as they distinguished Fry-by referring to their emergency
and short-term nature.1 64 The Court did not. Instead, it simply found
that Case involved the war power and as a result "has no direct
application to the questions we consider today at all." 16 The Court left
the impression that, with regard to the war power, no affirmative
limitations exist. 166 In this way, the majority drew back from its
apparent position that all article I section 8 powers should be treated
alike, 167 without offering any sound approach to that issue.
The second significant problem in Usery is the Court's method of
resolving the state sovereignty issue once it was conceded to exist. By
inquiring only about the importance of the power to the states, the
Court did not permit itself to measure countervailing federal interests.
This is demonstrated by the Court's statement of the critical question
as ". . . whether [the state's determinations of the wages it pays to its
159. 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
160. Id. at 102 (quoting Fernandez v. Weiner, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945)).
161. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 421, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, Pub.
L. No. 383, ch. 325, 58 Stat. 640, Pub. L. No. 108, ch. 214, 59 Stat. 306.
162. See section III-B supra.
163. 426 U.S. at 843-44 n.14.
164. Id. at 853.
165. Id. at 854-55 n. 18. The dissent, however, saw the implications of the majority's
analysis of Case. Id. at 871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 854-55 n.18.
167. The Court reserved decision on the effects of state sovereignty on the spending
power. Id. at 852 n.17.
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employees] are 'functions essential to separate and independent existence.' "168 Similarly, the majority concluded "that insofar as the
challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.,'169 Neither of these statements allows a balancing of
federal and state interests. Indeed, nowhere does the majority even
mention any federal interest regarding the challenged amendments.
The only hint of balancing in the opinion is when the majority
distinguished Fry:
The enactment at issue there was occasioned by an extremely
serious problem which endangered the well-being of all the
component parts of our federal system and which only collective action by the National Government might forestall. The
means selected were carefully drafted so as not to interfere
with the States' freedom beyond a very limited, specified
period of time. The effect of the across-the-board freeze
authorized by that Act, moreover, displaced no state choices
as to how governmental'operations should be structured,
170 nor
did it force States to remake such choices themselves.
Even here, despite the attention to "an extremely serious problem"
which could only be solved by the "National Government," it could
be argued that the critical fact was that the Act "displaced no state
choices," and therefore the statute would pass muster even under the
majority's one-dimensional importance-to-the-state test. Still, this reference to countervailing national interests is, perhaps, the thread of
balancing which allowed Justice Blackmun to concur.171
The result of the majority's approach was that they arrived at a rule
but failed to give an adequate reason:
[T]he dispositive factor is that Congress has attempted to
exercise its Commerce Clause authority to prescribe
minimum wages and maximum hours to be paid
72 by the States
in their capacities as sovereign governments.
The difficulty is that the term "sovereign capacity" is too vague. Why
the state, as an employer, is acting in its "sovereign capacity" any
more in Usery than in Fry or by running a railroad as in UnitedStates
168. Id. at 845 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).

169. 426 U.S. at 852 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
170. Id. at 853.
171. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The dissenters had trouble being as
generous as Justice Blackmun. They could not find any balancing by the Court. Id. at

873-74, 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 852.
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v. California,7 3 California v. Taylor, 7 4 or Parden v. Terminal
Railway, 175 is not explained. Perhaps the majority felt that certain
state activities may be more in need of protection than others, and
therefore meant to resurrect the governmental function-proprietary
function dichotomy discarded in New York v. United States. 176 Justice
Rehnquist said earlier that such an approach "might in some form
prove useful;" still, there was no suggestion that it would prove
77
dispositive. 1
The third serious problem with Usery is the "essential function
test" adopted by the majority. This problem is closely related to the
second because the unworkable test adopted by the Court in large
measure caused its failure to balance. The test 7 1 was explained in
three different ways. First, the Court suggested that state policy
choices with respect to the structuring of its employment relationships
are "essential.', 79 Alternatively, the Court suggested that "state
policies regarding the manner in which [the state] will structure deliv80
ery of those governmental services which their citizens require,"'1
form the nexus of state sovereignty. Finally, the Court proposed that
the service provided is the key, that police and fire protection, as well
as health care and education, are the "integral . . . governmental

services" '18 1 which must be protected so that policy choices regarding
82
them are immune from federal regulation.1
In regard to the first formulation, to say that the state must be free
to structure its employment relationships as it sees fit proves too much.
Justice Stevens' dissent pointed out several aspects of the "employment relationship" which, in his view, are clearly regulable:
The Federal Government may, I believe, require the State to
act impartially when it hires or fires the janitor, to withhold
taxes from his paycheck, observe safety regulations when he
is performing his job, to forbid him from burning too much
173. 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (subjecting the State of California to the Federal Safety
Appliance Act).
174. 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (subjecting the State of California, as an employer, to the
Railway Labor Act).
175. 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (subjecting the State of Alabama, as an employer, to the
F.E.L.A.).
176. 326 U.S. 572, 580 (1946). See section I-B supra.
177. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 558 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
178. The Court was not altogether sure whether it was concerned with "essential"
functions or "traditional" functions. 426 U.S. at 845, 852.
179. Id. at 851.
180. Id. at 847.
181. Id. at 855. In fact, the Court used this test to distinguish Californiaon the basis
of the activity involved therein. Id. at 854 n. 18.
182. Id. at 855.
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soft coal in the capitol furnace, from dumping untreated refuse in an adjacent waterway, from overloading a stateowned garbage truck, or from driving either the truck or the
governor's limousine over 55 miles an hour.'83
The Court had previously recognized the federal government's power
over employment relationships in Parden v. TerminalRailway 8 4 (giving state railroad employees the right to sue their state under the
Federal Employers Liability Act in federal court) and California v.
Taylor' 85 (holding the State of California subject to the Railway Labor
Act rather than its own civil service laws with respect to state employees engaged in the operation of a railroad).
The second formulation offered by the Court, requiring protection
of all state policy choices in the delivery of services, 186 is likewise
overly broad. That formulation would also result in the exemption of
clearly regulable activities such as those mentioned above. The most
that can be argued is that when the federal government seeks to impose
direct and permanent regulations on state fiscal choices, and those
regulations compel the expenditures of state money without any other
valid purpose such as health or safety, then the federal government has
crossed into an area of state sovereignty and may be precluded from
1 87
exercising its power.
The third suggested test for essential functions-whether the particular state activity is an integral government service t 8--is probably
more workable than the other two but, in light of Usery itself, is both
too narrow and too broad. It is more workable because it looks to a
particular, discrete state activity. Such activities are more observable
and therefore more easily defined than the other two formulations of
essential state functions. It is too narrow, however, because Usery
invalidated the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to all state
employees, not merely those engaged in police, fire, education, and
183. Id. at 880-81. Some of these regulations, such as the 55 mile per hour speed
limit, fall within the spending power, not the commerce power, which, as the Court
noted, may be subject to different limitations. Id. at 852 n.17.
184. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
185. 353 U.S. 553 (1957).

186. 426 U.S. at 847.
187. Avoiding a conflict, the Usery Court found Fry distinguishable on two grounds.
First, Fry involved a temporary regulation to counter a nationalemergency. 426 U.S. at
853. Second, Fry involved the forbidding of an expenditure, not the compulsion of one.
Id. So construed, Usery is but one of a series of recent cases in which the Court has
acted to protect the state treasury. See Durchslag, Welfare Litigation, the Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereignty: Some Reflections on Dandridge v. Williams, 26 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 60 (1975).
188. 426 U.S. at 855.
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health services. Accordingly, the Court's purported distinction of
United States v. Californiaon the basis of the state's activity (operating a railroad) is inadequate.' 89 Indeed, the Court viewed the question
in California solely in terms of the state's interest: "California's
activity . . . was not in an area that the States have regarded as
integral parts of their governmental activities." 190 To assert that federal power must give way whenever the states (by majority vote?) decide
to "regard an area as essential" is clearly unworkable. The formulation is too broad because certain aspects of the delivery of all services
191
are regulable.
Ultimately, the problem with the concept of "essentiality" is that
to describe one state function as "essential" is no more than to express
a preference for one type of activity over another. The Constitution
expresses no such preferences. 1 92 To go further and declare that such
"essential functions" shall be immune from all federal regulation is to
impose a degree of rigidity on the commerce clause reminiscent of the
early commerce clause cases, which lacked the flexibility to deal with
changing national needs. 193 Even Justice Rehnquist has declared these
'9 4
early cases to be "anachronistic and doctrinally unsound.'
The fourth, and perhaps the most fundamental problem with the
approach taken by the Court in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery was
95
that the crucial issue was phrased in terms of the tenth amendment
and state sovereignty: "Whether these determinations are 'functions
essential to separate and independent existence.' "196 The Court's
analysis could have been more thorough, and it could have arrived at a
more workable standard, if it had considered the problem in terms of
the doctrine of separation of powers. If the majority had considered the
question whether, and to what degree, the judiciary is the proper
branch for resolution of federalism issues, then the Court would have
189. Id. at 854 n.18.
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. Justice Blackmun made clear in his concurrence that he would find federal
environmental -regulations applicable to states as polluters. Id. at 856. Thus, Justice
Blackmun and the dissenters in Usery form a majority on that issue. See District of
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635

(1977).
192. See the dissent of Justice Stevens, 426 U.S. at 880-81. See also note 183 supra
and accompanying text.
193. See section I-A supra.
194. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 551 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
195. "This Court has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress
to override State sovereignty. . . . In Fry the Court recognized that an express declaration of this limitation is found in the Tenth Amendment." 426 U.S. at 842 (citation
omitted).

196. Id. at 845 (citatioa omitted).
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confronted more directly the difficulties of defining the constitutionally recognizable state interests which require judicial protection.
The separation of powers question was central to Justice Brennan's
dissent. 9 7 Justice Brennan recalled the language of Chief Justice
199
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 198 reaffirmed in Wickard v. Filburn,
that the sole restraints on the commerce power arise from the political
process. 2" ° However, he did not investigate the reasons for these
statements, nor did he acknowledge that both cases involved federal
regulation of private activity, not state activity. As a result, Justice
Brennan did not inquire whether a distinction between state and private
activity has constitutional significance.2 0 1 Still, Justice Brennan never
suggested that state sovereignty is not relevant to the commerce
power; rather his focus was on the judicial role. 20 2 He found that the
only proper inquiry for the Court was the subject matter of regulation;
that is, whether the economic activity is or affects interstate commerce. 20 3 Any further inquiry is, according to Justice Brennan, "a
thinly veiled rationalization for judicial supervision of a policy judgment that our system of government reserves to Congress." 204 More
pointedly, he characterized the result in Usery as "a transparent cover
for invalidating
a congressional judgment with which [the majority]
20 5
disagree."
Justice Brennan argued that the structure of Congress creates implicit controls in favor of the states20 6 and for that reason judicially
imposed restraints in the area of taxation are to be construed narrowly. 207 The weakness of Justice Brennan's position is that the recogni197. Id. at 856-80.
198. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
199. 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).

200. 426 U.S. at 857-58, 875-76.
201. The only cases cited by the dissent which involved federal regulation of state

activity and thus constitute direct authority are Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946)
(concerning the war power), and, more directly, United States v. California, 297 U.S.

175 (1936), and Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (both concerning the commerce
power). The dissent also sought to distinguish Fry in order to buttress its position. 426

U.S. at 801 n.4.
202. Id. at 858, 861, 875-78. See notes 134-36 supra and accompanying text.
203. Id.at 876.
204. Id.

205. Id. at 867 (footnotes omitted). Justice Stevens, while unwilling to find that there
is no judicially cognizable federalism limit, largely concurred in Justice Brennan's
characterization of the result in Usery. Id. at 880-81. Justice Frankfurter foresaw a
similar problem in the tax immunity area if any restraints beyond "discrimination against
the state" were imposed. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 571,581 (1946). See note
41 supra and accompanying text.

206. 426 U.S. at 876-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 833 (quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 416 (1938)).
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tion of such implicit controls does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that no judicially imposed state sovereignty restraint ought to be
applied to the commerce power. Indeed, unless the taxing power can
be persuasively distinguished from the commerce power, the tax immunity cases would seem to require, at a minimum, the recognition of
judicially imposed restraints upon congressional regulation that discriminates against the states.2 °8
For this reason, the major flaw in the Usery decision is not the
Court's usurpation of a task wholly given over to the legislature,
because the allocation of some power in this area to the judiciary is at
least arguably permissible. The crucial problem is the majority's disregard for the text and the structure of the Constitution in reaching a
result which expands the judicial role. The text of the Constitution
provides only the ambiguous notion of reserved power, defined simply
as the residue after federal power is delegated. 20 9 Further, the structure
created by the Constitution expressly designates a separate body, the
Senate, to represent state interests equally. Since the principles adopted in Usery can only be tied to the vague terms of the tenth amendment, the danger of the Usery analysis is that it can be used to
invalidate any federal regulation directly affecting the states that a
majority of the court finds personally distasteful.
D.

The Aftermath: Cases Since Usery

Since the Usery decision, the Supreme Court has decided one
important case affecting the reach of Usery's holding. 210 In Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer,21 1 decided just four days after Usery, the Court allowed state
employees to recover money damages from their state when they
proved a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII. 2 12 The Court held
that the fourteenth amendment allows Congress to override a claim of
sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment.2 13
Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the majority, was careful to
distinguish between congressional power under the commerce clause,
and congressional power under section five of the fourteenth amend208. This was as far as Justices Stone and Frankfurter were able to agree in New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946). See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405

(1938). See also section II-B supra.
209. U.S. CONST. amend. X.

210. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). It has avoided deciding another. See
EPA v. Brown, 521 F.2d 827 (1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977).
211. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
212. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2000e-2(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
213. 427 U.S. at 456.
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ment. He observed that "the congressional authorization involved in
Parden [v. TerminalRailway Co. ,214 an earlier eleventh amendment
case] was based on the power of Congress under the commerce clause;
here, however, the Eleventh Amendment defense is asserted in the
context of legislation passed pursuant to Congress' authority under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. "215 After describing the fourteenth
amendment as "carv[ing] out" power for the federal government from
that of the states, 2 16 the Court sought to explain the nature of that
power:
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising
legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the
constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one
section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections
by their own terms embody limitations on state authority ...
Congress may, . . . for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits
against States or state officials which are constitutionally
impermissible in other contexts. 7
It would appear that in Fitzpatrick, the Court recognized a textual
difference between the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment, exempting the fourteenth amendment from state sovereignty
restraints otherwise applicable to federal power. Under the Court's
analysis, the commerce clause speaks to the subject matter of power-,
commerce-but not to the actor. Therefore, restraints running in favor
of a particular class of actors, the states, remain, despite the "plenary"
nature of congressional power over the subject matter. The fourteenth
amendment, however, speaks to both the subject matter and to the
states as a specialized class of actors. It declares that the states are
prohibited from a particular set of activities, 2 18 and that Congress may
exercise plenary power to enforce that prohibition. 2 19 Consequently,
while state sovereignty limits may affect the commerce power, they
214. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
215. 427 U.S. at 452-53.
216. Id. at 456 (quoting Ex parte State of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)).

217. 427 U.S. at 456. Seven members of the Court joined the majority opinion.
Justices Brennan and Stevens, concurring in the result, wrote separate opinions, each
finding the commerce power to be a separate, adequate basis for the enactment of the

1972 amendments to Title VII. Id. at 458. Justice Stevens differed from Justice Brennan
in that he questioned the fourteenth amendment basis of the claim, and found the
eleventh amendment defense to be inapplicable for other reasons. Id. at 459-60.
218. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
219. "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the

provisions of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
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are expressly prevented from restraining congressional power under
the fourteenth amendment by the text of that amendment.220
Following Usery and Fitzpatrickthere has been much litigation in
the lower federal courts concerning the effect of Usery on sections of
the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act other than the
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions invalidated by the
Court in Usery. In particular, this litigation has mainly concerned the
extension of the equal pay22 ' and age discrimination 222 provisions of
220. The pleasing simplicity of this analysis conceals two important problems. The
Fitzpatrick Court held that when Congress acts under the fourteenth amendment, the
protections of state sovereignty reflected in the eleventh amendment are a nullity. 427
U.S. at 456. At the same time, in both Fitzpatrick and Usery, the Court posited that
affirmative restraints inherent in the federal structure (created by the Constitution) are
not disarmed by the text of the commerce clause. See text accompanying notes 209, 210
supra. Yet in Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279
(1973), the Court acknowledged that the eleventh amendment could be overcome, under
certain circumstances, by congressional action. Id. at 284. Accord, Eldeman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974); Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). Apparently, the
fact that states can waive their eleventh amendment immunity is critical under the
spending (Eldeman) and commerce (Employees, Parden)powers, so that the only issue
under those article I, § 8 powers is whether Congress, by inviting or permitting state
activity in a given area, has required a waiver of eleventh amendment sovereign immunity. If that is so, however, it remains an anomaly why state sovereignty limitations
reflected in the tenth amendment (which cannot be overriden by congressional action)
form a more rigid barrier than those reflected in the eleventh amendment.
The second problem concealed in Fitzpatrick is the Court's apparent assumption,
without expressly deciding the issue, that sex is a "suspect classification" under the
fourteenth amendment requiring "strict scrutiny." The Court found the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a)-(g) (1970 & Supp. V 1975),
to have been a valid exercise of congressional power under section five of the fourteenth
amendment. 427 U.S. at 453 n.9. Presumably, this is because Congress could reasonably
find that sex discrimination exists, and is proscribed by section one of the fourteenth
amendment as defined by the judiciary. Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)
(recognizing Congress' section five power to alter local voting requirements). The
problem is that, prior to Fitzpatrick, no majority of the Court had ever expressly found
that discrimination on the basis of sex required "strict scrutiny." See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Yet, the statute at
issue went beyond proscribing sex discrimination unless there is a rational basis therefor; it proscribed all sex-based discrimination. An alternative explanation for this result
is equally disquieting. Recognizing that sex had never before been held to be a suspect
classification, the Court may have recognized congressional power under section five to
define, as well as to enforce, the rights declared under section one of the fourteenth
amendment. This argument has been suggested before as an alternative theory for the
holding in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1016-17 (1975); Burt, Miranda and Title II: A
Morganic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81. It had been viewed as being put to rest in
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). See Cohen, CongressionalPower to Interpret
Due Process and EqualProtection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975). But perhaps that theory
has been given new vitality by Fitzpatrick.
221. See, e.g., Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976);
Usery v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 421 F. Supp. III (N.D. Tex. 1976); Usery v.
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the FLSA to state employers. Although enacted under the commerce
power and inserted into the machinery of the FLSA, the Equal Pay
Act22 appears to have the same effect on state employers as the
sex discrimination provisions of Title VII. 2 24 As a result, most courts
have found the application of the analogous Equal Pay Act provisions
valid against the states on the basis of the fourteenth amendment as
interpreted in Fitzpatrick.2 2 Still, nearly every court that considered
the issue also found the Equal Pay Act valid against the states under the
commerce clause, adopting to a greater or lesser extent the balancing
approach called for by Justice Blackmun in Usery. 226
These decisions manifest lower courts' reluctance to adopt the
principles announced in Usery. They purport to balance the interests
involved, but have usually failed to adequately consider the state
interests. Often, courts have found the putative state interest to be in
sex discrimination, or have found a "minimal intrusion" without a
great deal of analysis.227 While these results may be explained in part
by the existence of an alternative rationale in section five of the
fourteenth amendment, they also demonstrate the problem of attempting to balance under Usery. Defining the state interest to be the harm
which the federal law seeks to avoid (sex discrimination in employment) is not what is required. Rather, Usery announced that certain
Washoe County School Dist., 79 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 33,438 (D. Nev. 1976); Usery v.
University of Texas, 79 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 33,448 (W.D. Tex. 1976); Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Christensen v. Iowa,
417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976); Howard v. Ward County, 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.D.

1976).
222. Usery v. Board of Educ., 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11, 184 (D. Utah 1976).
223. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970), Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56.
224. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-20) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
225. See, e.g., Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976).
226. See Usery v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Tex. 1976);
Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Usery
v. Fort Madison Community School Dist., 79 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 33,419 (S.D. Iowa
1976); Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976). Even the one case that
held the Equal Pay Act inapplicable to the states allowed recovery, but only under Title
VII. Howard v. Ward County, 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.D. 1976). Significantly, the

Howard Court ignored the advice of Justice Blackmun and applied Usery in an astonishingly mechanical manner. It is, perhaps, noteworthy that Howard was the first reported
case applying Usery to the Equal Pay Act.
227. See Usery v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Tex. 1976);
Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976); Usery v. Kent State Univ., 13
Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,374 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Usery v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ., 12
Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,184 (D. Utah 1976); Usery v. Univ. of Texas, 79 Lab. Cas.
33,448 (W.D. Tex. 1976); Usery v. Fort Madison Community School Dist., 79 Lab.
Cas. 33,419 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Usery v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1,79 Lab.
Cas. 33,462 (E.D. Wisc. 1976); Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., Civil No. C
76-248 (D.S.C. 1976).
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areas of state choices, particularly fiscal choices relating to employment, cannot be emasculated by broad federal regulation. Under Usery
the state's concern is its financial ability to structure employment
relationships in order to deliver services it considers essential. So
construed, the use of a true balancing approach would still likely result
in holding the equal pay provisions to be valid when applied to the
states-although the balance would be close. The provisions do not
emasculate state choices to the same degree as the minimum wagemaximum hour provisions. All the provisions reach the same range of
employment relationships, but the equal pay provisions are less intrusive because they do not prescribe levels of state expenditure; instead,
they only require that states act impartially when compensating their
228
employees. The states are still free to set the level of compensation.
This lesser harm to the states must be balanced against the harm to the
federal objective which would result from the invalidation of the
provisions. If the provisions were invalidated, a substantial segment of
the work force would be outside federal protection. As to those people,
the federal policy against sex discrimination in employment would be
totally frustrated. This harm to the federal interest is similar, if not the
same, as that which existed in Usery, but given the lesser intrusion
upon the states, the balance would tend to favor the federal interests.
While the result is not totally free from doubt, under Justice Blackmun's balancing test in Usery the extension of the Equal Pay Act to the
states should be valid.
The majority opinion in Usery left open several important issues
concerning the reach of the principles announced therein. 229 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 23 indicated the Court's resolution of the fourteenth
amendment issue. While the war power issue may not soon be resolved,23! the spending power may provide an interesting problem for
the Court.
Several courts have already found unpersuasive Usery-based, tenth
amendment challenges to spending power regulation of state and local
government activity. 232 In one case the court found that since the state
had the option of not participating in the spending program, and thus
228. Admittedly, the statute precludes leveling down as a remedy for violative conduct. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970). However, when states establish programs and pay
scales they are still free to set the level of compensation so long as it is impartial.
229. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17, 854-55 n.18.
230. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
231. It may never become an issue for want of a war to generate legislation under that
power.
232. See County of Los Angeles v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 496 (D.D.C. 1976); Dupler
v. City of Portland, 421 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Me. 1976).
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avoiding the regulation, the state's sovereignty was not impermissibly
violated.3 3 Another court simply stated that the spending power is not
the commerce power, holding the regulation reasonably related to the
federal statutory purpose, and therefore valid. 234 Neither of these cases
235
goes beyond the traditional view of the spending power.
So long as the Supreme Court accepts the proposition that states are
not coerced when they are able to opt out of a program to avoid
regulation,2 36 Usery will have no effect on the spending power. Under
a balancing approach, the states' ability to avoid coerced regulation
will mean that the claimed harm to state interests, however defined,
will be less than the harm which would have existed if -theregulation
had been imposed under the commerce clause. Unless the Court
attempts to evaluate the amount of actual coercion resulting from the
potential loss of federal monies, regulations reasonably related to a
valid federal interest will be sustained. The federal purpose will be
furthered by states participating in the program, while state interests
can still be protected by individual states opting out of the program. If
the enactment is held invalid, however, the federal interest will be
frustrated with no additional benefit to the states. Thus, balancing the
harm would require sustaining the federal act.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In formulating state sovereignty restraints on Congress' regulatory
power under the commerce clause, it should be recognized that the
type of restraint discussed in Usery is different from the issue of the
proper subject matter for regulation. 237 The magnitude of the effect on
interstate commerce caused by a given economic activity, involved in
the early commerce clause cases, is not at issue. Rather, state
sovereignty is called upon to protect a special class of actors, the
states. The goal is to protect the states' freedom to engage in those
activities which are "essential to [their] separate and independent
existence." 238 The Constitution is silent on what constitutes such
functions; there are no powers delegated to the states. The problem is
to define reserved power as used in the tenth amendment with sufficient clarity and specificity to create an effective judicial tool, rather
233. County of Los Angeles v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 496, 502 n.27 (D.D.C. 1976).
234. Dupler v. City of Portland, 421 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Me. 1976).

235. The traditional tests were developed in Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548 (1937), and Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n., 330 U.S. 127 (1947).

236. E.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n., 330 U.S. 127 (1947);
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).

237. See section II-A supra.
238. 426 U.S. at 845 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71,76 (1869)).
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than a talisman. Since a state can be defined only in terms of the
activities in which it engages, the judiciary is on weak constitutional
ground when it selects any particular activity for protection because the
Constitution makes no such choices. The most that can be said with
any assurance is that the Court has the power to save the tenth
amendment from becoming a nullity since, by the terms of the tenth
amendment, some power is reserved. In contrast, when the Court acts
to protect federal power over interstate commerce from state interference, it is acting under two express constitutional provisions, the
commerce clause and the supremacy clause. 239 As a result, the Court
stands on much firmer constitutional ground.
In seeking to define and protect state interests in the performance
of their "essential functions," it must be recognized that over the
years government at all levels has taken on the task of providing
services previously supplied by the private sector.2' Most of these
activities can be said to affect interstate commerce to a degree sufficient to bring them within the purview of Congress' commerce power. 24 1 The displacement of the private sector by expanding state services adds to the operational definition of the state. If a state can be
heard to claim that these activities are (or become) "essential," then,
in effect, the states have been given the power to define and enlarge an
affirmative constitutional right, and, correspondingly, to reduce feder242
al power. Such a result is clearly undesirable.
One final point needs to be made. In the areas of due process and
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment, the level of judicial
scrutiny has been said to vary, depending upon how well the political
process can work to adequately balance and protect the conflicting
interests involved.243 Similarly, in the tax immunity area, Justice Stone
described state immunity as more limited than federal immunity because of the ability of the political system to operate as an effective
control.2 4 4 While federal interests are not represented in state legisla239. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
240. Examples include water and sewer services, electric power, mass transit, and
health care.
241. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
242. Justice Stone recognized the same problem in the area of tax immunity: -[T]he
national taxing power would be unduly curtailed if the state, by extending its activities
could withdraw from it subjects of taxation traditionally within it." New York v. United

States, 326 U.S. 572, 589 (1946) (citations omitted) (Stone, J., concurring). See Helvering
v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 225 (1934). See also text accompanying note 190 supra.
243. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (equal
protection); United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (due
process).
244. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 412 (1938).
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tures, the states are represented in the federal Congress and their
245
interests are thus protected from potentially harsh federal taxation.
The Usery majority expressly rejected this caveat,246 but it is submitted that where political restraints operate, the Court should defer to the
controls of the political process. This principle of judicial self-restraint
should apply whenever state sovereignty is held to be an affirmative
limit on congressional power. Stated more broadly, whenever the
Court is acting as a constitutional arbitrator between competing political power centers, the judiciary must be sensitive to its own need for
independence. It should exercise restraint, not only because the parties
have an alternate means of dispute resolution, but also because judicial
self-interest demands it. If the Court involves itself in political matters
it invites political manipulation.
By rejecting the principle of judicial restraint, Usery stands as
potentially one of the most activist decisions of this generation. Seizing the tenth amendment as an "affirmative limitation" on the power
of Congress, the Court has fashioned a tool to reshape the political
judgments of the legislative branch. Because the doctrine of "essential" or "traditional" functions is undefined by the text of the Constitution, the judiciary is bound to develop its own set of doctrines to
implement this new limitation on federal power.
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246. 426 U.S. at 841-42 n.12. See note 149 supra.
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